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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AFTER
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA V. GARRETT: SHOULD THE
STATES BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT?
NICOLE S. RICHTER*

INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was signed into
law in 1990 to establish a “comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”1
Its provisions significantly expanded the legal rights of forty-three
million Americans with physical or mental disabilities,2 provided
protection from employment discrimination and guaranteed the
provision of public services and accommodations.3 As enacted, the
ADA applied to state actors, local actors, private employers and
private businesses.4
However, the ADA’s application to the states was called into
doubt by the Supreme Court’s decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents.5 In Kimel, the Court held that the Age Discrimination in
* J.D., Valparaiso University School of Law, 2001, magma cum laude. Ms. Richter is a
law clerk for the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213, 12101(b)(1) (1995).
President Bush signed the ADA into law on July 26, 1990. Randy Chapman, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: Civil Rights for Persons with Disabilities, 19 COLO. LAW. 2233, 2233 (1990).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (finding that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities”).
3. See Americans with Disabilities Act, Subchapter I (“Title I”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117
(1995). “No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, or other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.” Id. § 12112(a); see also Americans with Disabilities
Act, Subchapter II (“Title II”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (1995). Title II provides that “no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by such entity.” Id. § 12132.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5). Recipients of federal funds are also subject to the Rehabilitation
Act, which prohibits discrimination against applicants or employees with disabilities. See
Barbara A. Lee, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: The
Limitations of Rehabilitation Act Precedent, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 201, 205 (1993).
5. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). In recent cases, the Court has invalidated other statutes as they
apply to the states. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of Boerne v.
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Employment Act (“ADEA”) was unconstitutional as applied to the
states.6 The Court reasoned that the ADEA was not a valid exercise
of Congress’s power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment (“Section Five”).7 Thus, it held that states are immune from
lawsuits by private actors for money damages under the ADEA
because Congress did not validly abrogate the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity.8
After Kimel, several legal commentators expressed concern that
the ADA would suffer a similar fate9 and the federal courts of appeals
were split on the issue.10 This speculation arose because the ADA
and the ADEA are similar in many respects.11 For example, like age
discrimination, disability discrimination is scrutinized under the
deferential rational basis standard applied in Equal Protection
review.12 However, there are also distinguishing factors. Some
commentators found that, unlike the ADEA, the ADA is supported
by a “voluminous congressional record”13 and findings of discrimination by the states against the disabled.14
Against this background, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in University of Alabama v. Garrett15 to resolve the issue.16 In Garrett,
the Court invalidated the ADA as applied against the states by

Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
6. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
7. Id.; see infra note 38 for the language of the Fourteenth Amendment.
8. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91. The Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
9. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Major Change in Civil Rights Litigation, 36 TRIAL 94
(2000); John W. Parry, Trend—The Supreme Court and the ADA: Sovereign Immunity Musical
Chairs, 24 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 186 (2000); Susan E. Sutor & Susan
Elizabeth Grant Hamilton, The Constitutional Status of the ADA: An Examination of Alsbrook
v. City of Maumelle in Light of Recent Supreme Court Decisions Concerning the Eleventh
Amendment, 19 REV. LITIG. 485 (2000).
10. See infra note 62.
11. See generally Keith R. Fentonmiller & Herbert Semmel, Where Age and Disability
Discrimination Intersect: An Overview of the ADA for the ADEA Practioner, 10 GEO. MASON
U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 227 (2000).
12. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485–86 (1970).
13. Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 95.
14. See infra Section III.B.
15. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in two prior cases but both
cases settled before the Court heard them. See Fla. Dep’t of Corr. v. Dickson, 528 U.S. 1132
(granting certiorari), cert. dismissed, 528 U.S. 1184 (2000); Alsbrook v. Arkansas, 528 U.S. 1146
(granting certiorari), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000).
16. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001).
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holding that the Eleventh Amendment prevents private individuals
from suing states in federal court for money damages.17 This holding
has important implications for employees across the country. Many
federal antidiscrimination statutes that protect employee rights from
state infringement are enforced through private litigation.18 Limitations on this option could severely restrict the enforcement of these
statutes altogether.19 Furthermore, the Court’s analysis of the ADA
in Garrett failed to distinguish the ADA from the ADEA, leaving the
future of Section Five litigation uncertain.20 With these concerns in
mind, this Note argues that the ADA should apply to the states
because it is a valid congressional abrogation of states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity. It will compare the Court’s findings in Kimel
with the findings in Garrett to show that unlike the ADEA, the ADA
is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under Section Five.
Section I of this paper will discuss the ADEA and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kimel.21 It will show how the Court reached the
conclusion that ADEA does not validly abrogate the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Section I will also discuss the ADA, focusing
on the Title I provisions on employment discrimination to show why
the ADA is vulnerable to constitutional challenge. Next, Section II
will discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Garrett, where the Court
held that a private individual cannot sue a state in federal court for
money damages under the ADA. Section III will draw upon the
reasoning in Kimel and Garrett to show that why the ADA is
distinguishable from the ADEA and why the ADA should apply to
the states. Finally, this Note will conclude that the ADA validly
abrogates the states’ sovereign immunity.

17. Id. at 356.
18. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 450–51 (2000)
(finding that most federal antidiscrimination law is normally enforced through private law suits
against the states); see also infra note 56.
19. Id. at 441–42. After Garrett, a private plaintiff can still sue a state under the ADA in
federal court for an injunction and may be able to sue a state under the ADA in state court. Id.
at 451 n.44.
20. Id. at 443–44 (stating that the Supreme Court’s Section Five jurisprudence could
develop in different directions depending on how Kimel is interpreted).
21. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).

882

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

I.

[Vol. 77:879

BACKGROUND

A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The ADEA was enacted in 1967. Under the ADEA it is unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.”22 It protects individuals who
are forty years of age or older23 from age discrimination in the
conditions and privileges of employment.24 The ADEA applies to
private sector employers with twenty or more employees and the
federal government.25 It was amended in 1974 to allow suits against
the states and their subdivisions.26 However, the Supreme Court
recently held in Kimel that a state cannot be sued under the ADEA.27
In Kimel, the Eleventh Circuit consolidated three cases that alleged ADEA violations against state employers and, in a divided
panel opinion, held that the ADEA did not validly abrogate the
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.28 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the split in the federal courts of appeals
of whether the ADEA validly abrogated the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity.29 The Court began its opinion with a
discussion of the Eleventh Amendment and found that it protects
nonconsenting states from lawsuits in federal court.30 The Court
stated that Congress may abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity and
it articulated the following two-part test to determine if an abrogation
is valid: (1) “whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to
22. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1995). The ADEA was enacted to “promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the
impact of age on employment.” Id. § 621(b).
23. Id. § 631(a). The remedial provisions of the ADA were adopted from the FLSA. H.
Lane Dennard, Jr. & Kendall L. Kelly, Price Waterhouse: Alive and Well Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 51 MERCER L. REV. 721, 727 (2000).
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
25. Id. §§ 630(b)–(d), 631(b). Under the ADEA, an employer has five affirmative defenses
to a claim of age discrimination: (1) age is a bona fide occupation qualification that is reasonably
necessary to the normal operations of the business; (2) the action is based on factors other than
age; (3) the observation of the terms of a bona fide seniority system; (4) the observation of the
terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan; and (5) discharge or discipline for good cause. Id. §
623(f).
26. Id. § 630(b).
27. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
28. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (1998).
29. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 72 (citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 525 U.S. 1121 (1999)).
30. Id.; see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 634–65 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida., 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).

2002]

THE ADA AFTER UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA V. GARRETT

883

abrogate [a state’s sovereign] immunity;” and (2) “if it did, whether
Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.”31
The Court proceeded by applying the test to the ADEA.32
In applying the first prong of the test, the Court stated that Congress may abrogate the states’ immunity from suit in federal court
only by “making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute.”33 The Court then analyzed Section 216(b) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), a section of the ADEA, which states
that employees can maintain actions for back pay “against any
employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State Court of
competent jurisdiction.”34 The Court found that this language,
interpreted in conjunction with other sections of the ADEA, clearly
expressed Congress’s intent to abrogate the states’ immunity.35
Next, the Court analyzed the ADEA to determine whether it
passed the second prong of the test: whether Congress acted pursuant
to a valid grant of constitutional authority when it authorized suits
against the states under the ADEA.36 The Court summarily dismissed the argument that Congress could derive its authority from the
Commerce Clause.37 Turning to an analysis of Section Five, the Court
found that Congress can abrogate the states’ immunity under this
provision.38 The Court found that Section Five is an affirmative grant
31. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73 (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55).
32. Id.; see generally Tanya Smith, Current Event: Kimel v. Florida. Bd. of Regents 120 S.
Ct. 631 (2000), 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 553 (2000).
33. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)).
34. Id. at 73–74; see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1995).
35. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 74. The Court relied on several provisions of the ADEA and the
FLSA in reaching this conclusion. Id. at 73–74. It began with 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1995), which
states that “[t]he provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers,
remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211(b), 216, . . . and 217 of [the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938].” Id. at 73. The Court interpreted this section in light of 29 U.S.C. §
216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which authorizes actions for back pay “against any
employer . . . in any Federal or State Court of competent jurisdiction.” Id. at 73–74. The Court
found that these provisions, when read as a whole, showed Congress’s intent to abrogate the
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 74.
36. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80.
37. Id. The Commerce Clause provides, “The Congress shall have the power to . . .
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3.
38. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
Section 1. . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . . .
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, §§ 1, 5.
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of power to Congress to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.39 The Court warned, however, that there are limitations
on this power. While Congress can enforce the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it cannot define what comprises a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.40
To determine whether Congress had overstepped its boundaries
when it enacted the ADEA, the Court applied a congruence and
proportionality test: whether there was a “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end.”41 The Court began with an analysis of
age discrimination to determine if the ADEA could pass the test.42
The Court’s analysis relied heavily on the fact that age is not a suspect
class and, thus, does not receive heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.43 The Court held
that age discrimination receives rational basis review, which allows
states to discriminate on the basis of age if the discrimination is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.44 The Court reasoned
that the ADEA’s broad restriction on age discrimination was a
disproportionate remedy because it prohibited what would be
otherwise constitutional conduct under the deferential rational basis
standard.45
The Court also examined the ADEA’s legislative history to determine if the ADEA was “congruent and proportional.”46 It found
that Congress did not identify a pattern of age discrimination by the
states when the ADEA was enacted.47 The Court rejected the
39. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80–81.
40. Id. The Court stated that the ultimate interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
substantive provisions is the “province” of the judicial branch. Id.
41. Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). Flores applied the
standard to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and held the act to be inappropriate
legislation under Section Five.
42. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83.
43. Id. There are three levels of Equal Protection review: strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, and rational basis scrutiny. See Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis
Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 595–96 (1999–2000).
44. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83.
45. Id. The Court reasoned that age classifications were distinguishable from race or
gender classifications because race and gender are “so seldom relevant to the achievement of
any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy.” Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 440 (1985)).
46. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88. The Court stated that “[d]ifficult and intractable problems often
require powerful remedies, and we have never held that § 5 precludes Congress from enacting
reasonably prophylactic legislation.” Id.
47. Id. at 89. The Court found that Congress’s extension of the ADEA to the states was
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congressional findings of age discrimination, finding that they were
little more than “isolated sentences clipped from floor debates and
legislative reports.”48 The Court concluded that, absent a legislative
finding that the states were unconstitutionally engaging in age
discrimination, broad, prophylactic legislation was unnecessary and,
thus, the ADEA was not a congruent remedy.49 Accordingly, the
Court found that the ADEA was not a valid exercise of Congress’s
power under Section Five and that its extension to the states in 1974
was, therefore, unconstitutional.50 This decision threatened the
validity of the ADA and continues to threaten many other civil rights
statutes.51
B.

The Americans with Disabilities Act

Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to protect a “discrete and
insular minority who . . . have been subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment.”52 Title I of the ADA prohibits employment
discrimination because of disability in job application procedures,
hiring, advancement, discharge, compensation, training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.53 To be covered by
the Act, an individual must have a “physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities,” must
have “record of such impairment,” or must be “regarded as having
such an impairment.”54 Moreover, she must be qualified to perform
“an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem.” Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 91. The Court held that Congress’s failure to document a pattern of significant
discrimination by the states, while not dispositive, confirmed the Court’s finding that broad,
prophylactic legislation was not necessary to remedy age discrimination. Id.
50. Id. at 91. The Court stated, however, that aggrieved employees could still seek redress
under state age discrimination statutes. Id. at 91–92.
51. See Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 95–96. Other federal civil rights statutes, such as the
Family and Medical Leave Act and the Equal Pay Act, are vulnerable to constitutional attack
after Kimel. Id. While race and gender discrimination statutes will still be upheld, the Court
considers these types of discrimination to be different because they receive a higher level of
judicial scrutiny. Id. Thus, the Court accords Congress more power to remedy these forms of
discrimination than it does for other types of discrimination that receive rational basis review.
Id.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1995).
53. Id. § 12112(a). For a detailed discussion of prohibited employment practices, see
Jeffrey Ivan Pasek et al., Compliance by the Private Sector with the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 62 PA. B. ASS’N. Q. 139, 144–45 (1991).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(A)–(C).
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) regulations define “substantially limits” as:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or
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the essential functions of the job “with or without reasonable
accommodation.”55
Title I of the ADA applies to private employers with fifteen or
more employees and federal and state governments.56 Congress
specifically abrogated the states’ immunity under section 12202 of the
ADA, declaring “[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in
Federal or State court.”57 However, the ADA, as applied to the
states, was subject to some of the same attacks that led to the
invalidation of the ADEA in Kimel. First, under Equal Protection
analysis, disabled individuals are accorded only rational basis
review.58 Traditional rational basis scrutiny does not afford much
protection from unjust government action.59 Second, some legal
commentators attacked the legislative history of the ADA, claiming
that it did not contain adequate findings of state discrimination
against the disabled.60 Thus, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett to resolve the issue of whether the ADA validly abrogated
the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.61
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an
individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition,
manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can
perform that same major life activity.
EEOC Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(j)(1) (1996). Major life activities include “functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”
Id. § 1630.2(i).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Under the ADA, reasonable accommodations include, but are
not limited to, making existing facilities accessible to and usable to individuals with disabilities,
job restructuring, part-time work, modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
modification of equipment, and the provision of qualified readers or interpreters. Id. §
12111(9)(A),(B). However, employers are not required to provide reasonable accommodations
if they would cause an “undue hardship on the operation of the business.” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
56. Id. § 12111(5)(A). The ADA is enforced through the provisions of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. § 12117. Generally, an aggrieved individual must file a
complaint with the EEOC. Id. § 2000e–5(e). If the EEOC issues a right to sue letter after
reviewing the claim, the individual may proceed with a private civil action. See Anne E.
Beaumont, Note, This Estoppel Has Got to Stop: Judicial Estoppel and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1529, 1542 (1996).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1995).
58. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485–86 (1970).
59. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term Forward: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 79 (1997) (finding that judicial scrutiny under rational basis
review is a “virtual rubber stamp”); FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314
(1993) (stating that rational basis review is the “paradigm of judicial restraint”).
60. See, e.g., infra note 79.
61. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA V. GARRETT
After Kimel, several federal appellate courts wrote opinions on
whether the ADA could be enforced against the states.62 However,
the courts were split on the issue and thus left it unresolved. The
United States Supreme Court settled the issue in Board of Trustees of
the University of Alabama v. Garrett,63 by ruling that the states are
immune from private suits under the ADA for money damages in
federal court.64
A. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Garrett to determine
whether employees of the State of Alabama could recover money
damages in a suit against the State for a violation of Title I of the
ADA.65 After a brief discussion of the relevant provisions in Title I of
the ADA, the Court addressed the first question articulated in Kimel:
whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the
62. The Tenth Circuit and the Second Circuit upheld the ADA as applied to the states
after Kimel. See Cisneros v. Wilson, 226 F.3d 1113, 1128 (10th Cir. 2000); Kilcullen v. N.Y. State
Dep’t of Labor, 205 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2000). Other courts also decided cases in favor of the ADA
prior to Kimel. See Garrett v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 193 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir.
1999); Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1175 (9th Cir. 1999); Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298,
311 (2d Cir. 1999); Amos v. Md. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 178 F.3d 212, 222–23 (4th Cir. 1999);
Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 438 (5th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Commonwealth, 2000 WL
15073 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Johnson v. State Tech. Ctr. at Memphis, 24 F. Supp. 2d 833, 842 (W.D.
Tenn. 1998); Thrope v. State, 19 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821–22 (S.D. Ohio 1998); Lamb v. John
Umstead Hosp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 498, 510 (E.D.N.C. 1998); Meekison v. Voinovich, 17 F. Supp. 2d
725, 730 (S.D. Ohio 1998); Anderson v. Dep’t. of Pub. Welfare, 1 F. Supp. 2d 456, 468 (E.D. Pa.
1998); Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 960 F. Supp. 1276, 1282–83 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
The Third and the Seventh Circuits found that the ADA was invalid after Kimel. See
Lavia v. Pennsylvania, 224 F.3d 190, 204–05 (3d Cir. 2000); Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207
F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2000). Other jurisdictions also held that the ADA was not valid as
applied to the states before Kimel. See DeBose v. Nebraska, 186 F.3d 1087, 1088 (8th Cir. 1999);
Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1009–10 (8th Cir. 1999); Brown v. N.C. Div. of
Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698, 708 (4th Cir. 1999); Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 33 F. Supp. 2d 668,
675 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1175 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
63. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
64. Id. at 374. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion; Justices O’Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined
by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. at 376.
65. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). In Garrett, there were two plaintiff/respondents. Id. at 356.
Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, sued the University of Alabama in Birmingham because the
university Hospital had removed her from her position as Director of Nursing after she took a
substantial leave to treat breast cancer. Id. at 362. As a result, she was forced to take a lowerpaying job. Id. Milton Ash, a security officer, filed suit after the Alabama Department of
Youth Services failed to honor his requests for reasonable accommodations. Id.
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states’ sovereign immunity.66 Without hesitation, the Court found
that this requirement was met by section 12202 of the ADA.67 The
Court then turned to the second question addressed in Kimel:
whether Congress acted within its constitutional authority under
Section Five when it abrogated the states’ immunity.68
As it had in Kimel, the Court prefaced its analysis of the ADA
with an acknowledgment that Congress’s power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment includes the power to remedy and to deter
violations of the Amendment.69 It stated that in doing so, Congress
may “prohibit[] a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that
which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.”70 However,
the Court also warned that it, not Congress, retains the power to
define the substantive meaning of the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.71
With these principles in place, the Court proceeded by identifying the scope of the constitutional right at issue.72 Relying on City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,73 it held that disability
discrimination receives rational basis scrutiny.74 The Court stated that
a classification based upon disability does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if there is a rational
relationship between the disparity of the treatment and a legitimate
government purpose.75 Thus, it found that the states are not required
to make special or reasonable accommodations for the disabled under
the Equal Protection Clause as long as their actions are rational.76

66. Id. at 363–64; see also supra note 31.
67. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363–64; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text for the
language of 42 U.S.C. § 12202.
68. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364. The Court turned to Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it found that the Eleventh Amendment prevented Congress from enacting
the ADA under its Article I Commerce Clause power. Id. The Court’s recent limitations on
Congress’s Section Five power has led some legal commentators to speculate that opponents of
federal antidiscrimination laws will view Garrett as an invitation to challenge statutes enacted
under Congress’s Spending Clause power. See generally David G. Savage, The Next Federalism
Frontier: After ADA Case, States’ Rights Activists May Test Congress’ Spending Power, A.B.A.
J., Apr. 2001, at 30–32.
69. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
70. Id. (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 63 (2000)).
71. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
72. Id.
73. 473 U.S. 432 (1985); see infra notes 114–16 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Cleburne.
74. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365–66.
75. Id. at 367 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
76. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366–67.
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After establishing the permissible scope of disability discrimination, the Court examined the legislative history of the ADA to
determine whether Congress identified a history and pattern of
unconstitutional employment discrimination by the states against the
disabled.77 While the Court acknowledged that Congress made
general findings of discrimination against individuals with disabilities,
it reasoned that these findings did not show a pattern of discrimination by the states.78 With regard to findings in the record that
specifically involved the states, the Court found that these findings
were “unexamined, anecdotal accounts of ‘adverse, disparate
treatment by state officials.’”79 The Court also found that Congress’s
failure to mention the states in its legislative findings indicated that it
did not find a pattern of discrimination by the states.80 Thus, even
though the ADA had a more developed legislative history with
regard to the states than the ADEA had, the Court nonetheless found
that this evidence was not enough.81
Finally, the Court stated that even if the legislative history could
be interpreted to show a pattern of disability discrimination by the
states, the ADA failed to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity because it was not “congruent and proportional.”82 The
Court reasoned that the reasonable accommodations requirement of
the ADA, which was designed to limit an employer’s liability, still
requires state employers to go beyond what is constitutionally
required by rational basis scrutiny.83 Under the reasonable accommodations standard, an employer can avoid liability by showing that
the accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the operation
of the business.84 However, the Court reasoned that, even with the
undue hardship standard, the reasonable accommodation standard is
unconstitutional because it “makes unlawful a range of alternate
responses that would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing

77. Id. The Court held that evidence of state violations does not include discrimination by
local governments. Id. at 368–69.
78. Id. at 370.
79. Id. at 370–71 (citations omitted). In Erickson v. Board of Governors, the Seventh
Circuit also found that the legislative history of the ADA did not include examples of
“irrational” discrimination by the states. 207 F.3d 945, 951 (7th Cir. 2000).
80. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370–71.
81. Id. at 372–73; see also supra notes 46–48 (discussing the insufficient findings of age
discrimination in the legislative history of the ADEA).
82. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370–74.
83. Id.
84. See supra note 55 for a discussion of reasonable accommodations.
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an ‘undue burden’ upon the employer.”85 Based on these findings, the
Court concluded that the ADA was not a valid abrogation of the
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.86
B.

The Dissenting Opinion

While the majority opinion found that the ADA could not apply
to the states, four Justices, led by Justice Breyer, dissented, finding
that the ADA is appropriate enforcement legislation.87 The dissenting opinion began with an examination of the legislative history of the
ADA.88 It found that Congress had compiled a “vast legislative
record” indicating “‘massive, society-wide discrimination’” against
the disabled.89 The dissent reasoned that these findings, although
general, implicate state governments because they are part of general
society.90
Justice Breyer also found that there are roughly three hundred
examples of state discrimination against disabled individuals in the
legislative history of the ADA.91 He responded to the majority’s
criticism that these findings were anecdotal evidence by stating that
Congress is not required to make the same factual findings as a court
of law.92 He reasoned that, unlike a court, Congress often relies upon
general conclusions from anecdotal and opinion-based evidence.93 He
85. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372–74. The Court also found that the undue hardship provision of
the ADA goes beyond the boundaries of rational basis review because it shifts the burden to the
employer to prove that it would suffer an undue hardship, while rational basis review requires
the plaintiff to negate the reasonable basis for the employer’s decision. Id.; see also supra note
60.
86. Id. at 372–76. The Court stated that to uphold the ADA as applied to the states “would
allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court.” Id. at 374.
Justice Kennedy, who was joined by Justice O’Connor, wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize
that he agreed with the majority’s finding only insofar as it held that a private individual could
not sue an unconsenting state for money damages in federal court. Id. at 374–76.
87. Id. at 376–78.
88. Id. at 377–82.
89. Id. at 377 (citations omitted). In a dissenting opinion in Erickson v. Board of
Governors, Judge Wood found that unlike the ADEA, the ADA was supported by legislative
findings of discrimination by the states. 207 F.3d 945, 957 (7th Cir. 2000). She observed that
Congress made findings of discrimination in areas that are traditionally controlled by state and
local governments, such as education, health services, and transportation. Id. at 957–58.
90. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 377–79. He reasoned that states are not immune from the
“stereotypical assumptions” that Congress found to be present in society at large. Id.
91. Id. Appendix C to Justice Breyers’ dissenting opinion lists hundreds of findings of state
discrimination against the disabled. Id. at 390–423.
92. Id. at 379–83. Justice Breyer stated “the Congress of the United States is not a lower
court.” Id. at 383. He also noted that, traditionally, the Court has not required Congress to
undertake an “extensive investigation” of evidence before it. Id. at 380.
93. Id.
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found that Congress’s fact-finding role is distinguishable from a
court’s because Congress can “readily gather facts from across the
Nation, assess the magnitude of a problem, and more easily find an
appropriate remedy.”94
After analyzing the legislative history of the ADA, Justice
Breyer turned to the issue of congruence and proportionality.95 With
regard to the reasonable accommodations requirement, he acknowledged that the standard may require a state employer to take
measures that go beyond the mandates of the Equal Protection
Clause.96 However, he reasoned that this does not make the ADA
invalid because, under the Court’s own reasoning, Congress is
allowed to go beyond the minimum power granted by Section Five to
regulate conduct that is constitutional.97 Under this principle, the
reasonable accommodations provision is a valid exercise of congressional power even though it may be broader than constitutionally
necessary.98
Justice Breyer also found the Court’s decision was contrary to
the very purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.99 He stated that the
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted specifically to expand the power
of the federal government and to limit the power of the states.100
Overall, he found that the Court’s decision “saps § 5 of independent
force” and concluded that the ADA is proper legislation under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.101

94. Id. at 384. Justice Breyer also noted that Congress is distinguishable from a court of
law because acts of Congress directly reflect the will of the people. Id. Members of Congress
can collect information directly from their constituents, which allows them to better understand
the extent of discrimination by the states. Id.
95. Id. at 385–86.
96. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 385–86.
97. Id. at 385–88.
98. Id. In Erickson v. Board of Governors, Judge Wood also found that the ADA was not
as broad as the ADEA in its mandates. 207 F.3d 945, 956–57 (7th Cir. 2000) (Wood, J.,
dissenting). She found that, while the ADEA prohibits all employment discrimination against
individuals forty and above, with few limited exceptions, the reasonable accommodation
standard of the ADA is more narrowly tailored. Id. For the defenses to age discrimination, see
supra note 25.
99. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 387–88.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 388–89.
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III. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT VALIDLY
ABROGATES THE STATES’ ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the
Supreme Court held that the ADA does not validly abrogate the
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.102 However, several federal
appellate courts and four United States Supreme Court Justices
disagreed.103 Given the impact that Garrett could have on federal
antidiscrimination law, and given the Court’s failure to analyze the
ADA with regard to the ADEA, it is important to determine whether
the Court came to the correct conclusion concerning the ADA.104
This Section will analyze the ADA by comparing it to the
ADEA and show why private individuals should be able to bring suit
against the states in federal court under the ADA. It will apply the
two-part test from Kimel and Garrett in the analysis.105 However,
because all agree that Congress “clearly and unequivocally” intended
to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity,106 this Note
will focus on the second prong of the test and show why Congress
acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority under
Section Five.
A. The ADA Is a Congruent and Proportional Response to
Disability Discrimination
Congress abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity
under Section Five when it enacted the ADA.107 When Congress
enacts legislation under its Section Five powers, the remedy must be
“congruent and proportional” to the injury that it seeks to prevent.108
Specifically, “[Congress] must identify conduct transgressing the
Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive provisions and must tailor its
102. Id. at 371–74.
103. See supra notes 62 and 87–101 and accompanying text.
104. See Post & Siegal, supra note 18, at 440–43, 450–51.
105. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida., 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)). For clarity, this Note will also address the issues in the order
that the Court used in Kimel, even though a slightly different order was used in Garrett. This is
not necessarily, however, the order that the Court will use in future cases.
106. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363–64; Cisneros v. Wilson, 226 F.3d 1113, 1119 (2000) (stating
that there is “no doubt” that Congress unequivocally expressed an intent to abrogate the states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1995) (stating “[i]t is the purpose of [the ADA] . . . to invoke
the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment”).
108. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.”109
Under this standard, the following Section shows why the provisions
of the ADA are a congruent and proportional response to disability
discrimination.
1.

Disability Discrimination Receives Heightened Rational Basis
Scrutiny

In Garrett, the ADA suffered the same fate as the ADEA because age and disability discrimination both receive rational basis
review.110 Under rational basis scrutiny, government action is
constitutional as long there is a legitimate state interest behind it that
is rationally related to the means chosen by the government.111 In
particular, when the Supreme Court decided Garrett, it found that a
wide range of discriminatory treatment toward the disabled is
constitutional.112 However, the Supreme Court overlooked the fact
that it analyzed disability discrimination under a higher level of
rational basis review, referred to as second order rational basis
scrutiny113 in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.114 Under
109. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
110. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
112. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (2001). When discussing rational basis scrutiny as it applies to
disability discrimination, the Court stated, “States are not required by the Fourteenth
Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions towards
such individuals are rational.”
“They could quite hardheadedly—and perhaps
Id.
hardheartedly—hold to job qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the
disabled.” Id.
113. See Erickson v Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945, 956–57 (7th Cir. 2000) (Wood, J.,
dissenting). While Judge Wood acknowledged that age and disability discrimination receive
rational basis scrutiny, she found that the Supreme Court analyzed disability discrimination
under a heightened form of rational basis review in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Erickson, 207 F.3d at 956–57. In Cleburne, the Court carefully
analyzed an ordinance that discriminated against the mentally retarded, striking it down
because it was based upon “irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.” 473 U.S. at 450.
Judge Wood interpreted the Court’s use of “careful scrutiny” to indicate that the ADA was
enacted to prohibit irrational discrimination against the disabled, dispelling the idea that like the
ADEA, the ADA prohibits constitutional actions. Erickson, 207 F.3d at 956; see also Sutor &
Hamilton, supra note 9, at 501–02. While Sutor and Hamilton point to the deference accorded
the states under traditional rational basis review as a reason why the ADA is a disproportional
measure, they fail to address the Court’s use of second order rational basis review in Cleburne.
Id.
114. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In Cleburne, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the City of
Cleburne violated the Equal Protection Clause when it denied a special use permit to a group
home for the mentally retarded under a local zoning ordinance. Id. at 447–55. When analyzing
the City’s basis for treating the group home differently, the Court departed from traditional
rational basis review to conduct a “searching inquiry” into the City’s reasons. Id. at 460. In a
dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall called this form of rational basis review “second order”
rational basis review. Id. at 458.
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second order rational basis review, the Court takes an “active” rather
than a passive role in evaluating the government’s offered reasons for
the discrimination. The Court often looks beyond the government’s
objective reasons to determine if they are a pretext for “irrational”
action.115 In Cleburne, the Court applied second order rational basis
scrutiny to a zoning ordinance that discriminated against the mentally
retarded and found that it was unconstitutional because it was based,
in part, on “irrational prejudice.”116
Thus, the ADA is distinguishable from the ADEA. Unlike age
discrimination, disability discrimination receives more protection
under second order rational basis review.117 This expands the amount
of behavior that Congress can regulate under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, unlike the ADEA, there is less
potential for the ADA to regulate constitutional state practices.
2.

The ADA Targets Specific Employment Practices

Furthermore, the ADA is distinguishable from the ADEA because it regulates specific employment practices.118 While the
Supreme Court found that the mandates of the ADA, most specifically the reasonable accommodations requirement, were overbroad
because they extended beyond the permissible scope of Fourteenth
Amendment remedial measures,119 it failed to consider that Congress
has broad powers to both remedy and deter violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.120 In the dissenting opinion to Garrett, Justice
115. See Alfonso Madrid, Comment, Rational Basis Review Goes Back to the Dentist’s
Chair: Can the Toothless Test of Heller v. Doe Keep Gays in the Military?, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 167, 171–72 (1994). After Cleburne, the concept of second order rational basis
review was weakened by the Court’s decision in Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993). See Saphire,
supra note 43, at 635. However, the Court appeared to use a higher form of rational basis
review in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), indicating that second order rational basis
review is still viable.
116. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
117. Age discrimination is also distinguishable from disability discrimination because unlike
those aged forty and above, the disabled are a “discrete and insular” minority who have been
subjected to a history of discrimination. See Erickson, 207 F.3d at 956 (Wood, J., dissenting). In
contrast, “all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, will experience [old age].” Id.
(quoting Kimmel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000)). But see Sutor & Hamilton,
supra note 9, at 499 (arguing that the ADA is an improper exercise of Congress’s power because
disability discrimination receives rational basis review).
118. See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 310 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that “[t]he ADA
targets particular practices—in this case, discrimination in employment—and provides a remedy
following the time-tested model provided by the anti-employment discrimination provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964”).
119. See Erickson, 207 F.3d at 951.
120. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
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Breyer pointed out that the Court has repeatedly confirmed that
Congress is allowed to prohibit conduct that is constitutional as long
as it does not redefine the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment.121
As Judge Wood found in her dissenting opinion in Erickson v.
Board of Governors,122 the ADA does not regulate all employment
discrimination against the disabled.123 The ADA requires an
employer to make reasonable accommodations for a disabled
employee only if such accommodations would not impose an undue
burden on the employer.124 Therefore, if an employer is faced with
significant difficulty or expense in implementing reasonable accommodations, the ADA does not require them to do so.125
Thus, in contrast to the ADEA, the ADA does not prohibit all,
or almost all, discrimination against a given classification. It merely
prevents an employer from refusing to offer reasonable accommodations where they would be feasible.126 While this standard may
prohibit some constitutional conduct, under the Court’s reasoning
Congress is allowed to regulate some constitutional behavior.127
Therefore, the reasonableness standard for accommodations validly
enforces the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Its provisions do not go so far as to redefine the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause because the reasonableness standard and the
undue hardship provision limit the amount of state conduct that
Congress can regulate.
Therefore, the ADA is congruent and proportional; it regulates
only the most severe state discrimination against the disabled. If an
accommodation would create an undue burden on an employer, it can
rationally deny employment to a disabled individual, even under
second order rational basis scrutiny. Unlike the ADEA, the provisions of the ADA do not expand or redefine constitutional protection
for the disabled. They merely prevent an employer from engaging in
irrational discrimination such as the failure to provide reasonable
accommodations to an otherwise qualified employee. However, as
121. See id. at 974–75.
122. 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000).
123. Id. at 957.
124. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. It is estimated that when employers make
reasonable accommodations for disabled employees the average cost is less than one hundred
dollars. Margaret Grahm Tebo, Which Way for the ADA?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2000, at 58.
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1995).
126. Id.; see also id. § 12111–12112.
127. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
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the Court found in Kimel, the inquiry does not necessarily end with a
finding on the constitutionality of the regulated conduct; the Court
can ask whether Congress enacted reasonably prophylactic legislation
by examining the legislative record.128
B.

The ADA Is Supported by Significant Legislative Findings of
Disability Discrimination by the States

The ADA is also distinguishable from the ADEA because an
examination of the ADA’s legislative record reveals that the ADA is
a proportionate response to the problem of disability discrimination.
In Kimel, the Court found that “Congress never identified any
pattern of age discrimination by the states.”129 In contrast, in Garrett
Justice Breyer’s dissent found that Congress engaged in an extensive
investigation of disability discrimination before enacting the ADA.130
It commissioned two reports from the National Council on the
Handicapped, an independent federal agency, to discuss the sufficiency of existing federal laws.131 Congress also held thirteen hearings
on the ADA,132 sponsored sixty-three public forums across the
country,133 and reviewed evidence from almost five thousand
individuals on the issue of disability discrimination.134
With regard to the states, these resources uncovered pervasive
discrimination against the disabled by state and local governments.135
The finding included discrimination in areas under state control, such
as employment,136 education,137 voting and political access,138 public
128. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
129. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
130. See Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 377–78 (2001); see also Erickson, 207 F.3d at 958 (Wood, J.,
dissenting) (finding that Congress compiled an “immense legislative record” when it decided
whether to enact the ADA); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a).
131. See Brief for the United States at 9, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001) (No. 99-1240).
132. See Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64
TEMP. L. REV. 393, 393 n.1 (1991) (listing the hearings). Cook documented the history of
discrimination against the disabled by the states. Id. at 399–407. He pointed out that “virtually
every state” had laws that segregated people with disabilities, finding that they were a “blight on
mankind.” Id. at 400, 402.
133. See Brief for the United States at 11, Garrett.
134. Id. at 12.
135. See infra notes 136–42. But see Reply Brief at 4, Garrett (No. 99-1240) (stating that
there are no findings that the states engaged in unconstitutional disability discrimination).
136. See infra notes 141–42 and accompanying text.
137. See Brief for United States at 20–22, Garrett (No. 99-1240) (citing approximately
twenty examples of state discrimination in education from at least six different states). For
example, the Brief cited a finding that Ryan White, a child with AIDS, was denied access to a
public school because local parents feared that he would “infect” other children, when in fact his

2002]

THE ADA AFTER UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA V. GARRETT

897

transportation,139 and law enforcement.140 Specifically, Congress made
significant findings in the area of employment discrimination. For
example, one witness told Congress that he “was told by the Essex
Junction School System that they were not hiring me because I used a
wheelchair. I suspected it in other situations, but in that one, they
actually said that this was the reason.”141 Another witness, who
suffered from arthritis, reported that she was “denied a job, not
because she could not do the work but because ‘college trustees
[thought] normal students shouldn’t see her.’”142
These, along with other findings, distinguish the ADA from the
ADEA. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s finding that the Congressional findings “fall short of even suggesting [a] pattern of unconstitutional discrimination,”143 Congress identified numerous instances
where the states have irrationally discriminated against the disabled.144 Furthermore, as Justice Breyer found, Congress is not a
disease was not contagious through casual contact. See 136 CONG. REC. H2480 (daily ed. May
17, 1990) (statement of Rep. McDermott). Another example is a report of a student in
Vermont who had to attend class with students two grade levels behind him because he could
not climb a staircase that led to upper-level classrooms. See Education for All Handicapped
Children 1973–1974: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm.
on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 384 (1973) (statement of Peter Hickey).
138. See Brief of United States at 22–25, Garrett (No. 99-1240) (citing approximately thirtyone examples, from at least twelve different states, in which the states denied disabled
individuals equal access to the voting and political process). As an illustration, the Brief cited a
finding that a deaf individual was told that he or she could not vote because “you have to be
able to hear your voice” to vote. See Equal Access to Voting for Elderly and Disabled Persons:
Hearings Before the Task Force on Elections of the House Comm. on House Admin., 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 94 (1984) (Equal Access to Voting Hearings).
139. See Brief for United States at 25, Garrett (No. 99-1240) (citing approximately seven
instances of state discrimination against the disabled in the provision of public transportation
from at least three different states). For example, one report found that busses often pass
individuals in wheelchairs, with walkers, or with crutches because the drivers do not want to
take the time to pick them up. See 2 LEG. HIST. 1097 (statement of Bill Dorfer).
140. See Brief for United States at 26–27, Garrett (No. 99-1240) (citing approximately
seventeen examples where law enforcement officers discriminated against individuals with
disabilities from at least six different states). In one case, the police would not investigate a rape
allegation by a blind woman because she was not capable of making a visual identification. See
N.M. 1081; see also Brief for Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 15–16,
Garrett (No. 99-1240) (finding that “individuals with handicaps are all too often excluded from
schools and educational programs, barred from employment or are underemployed because of
archaic laws, denied access to transportation, buildings and housing . . .and are discriminated
against by public laws which frequently exclude citizens with handicaps”).
141. See Brief for United States at 18, Garrett (No. 99-1240) (quoting 2 LEG. HIST. 1076)
(statement of John Nelson).
142. See Brief for United States at 18, Garrett (No. 99-1240) (quoting S. REP. No. 116, at 7
(1989)).
143. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366.
144. Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89–91 (2000)). In Erickson, Judge Wood said that “[c]ombining the
explicit coverage of the sectors in which the states are the principal actors, with the deliberate
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court of law.145 It has broad fact-finding powers and its findings are
not held to the same evidentiary standard as a court of law.146 Under
this standard, Congress acted reasonably when it abrogated the states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Thus, unlike the ADEA, the
provisions of the ADA are simply a response to pervasive and
documented discrimination by the states.
CONCLUSION
Given the broad implications that the decision in Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett will have on other
federal antidiscrimination statutes, the Court should have found that
the ADA is a congruent and proportional response to disability
discrimination by the states. The ADA is distinguishable from the
ADEA because Congress appropriately tailored the remedies of the
ADA to include only reasonable measures against employment
discrimination. Furthermore, Congress supported the ADA with
extensive findings regarding discrimination by the states against the
disabled. Thus, private individuals should be able to bring suit for
money damages against a state employer in federal court under the
ADA.

decision of Congress to make the states subject to the statute, and finally with the enormous
legislative record documenting the depth of the problem of disability discrimination, I find the
second part of the Kimel approach satisfied by the ADA.” Erickson, 207 F.3d at 959 (Wood, J.,
dissenting).
145. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 377–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 381–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

